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Abstract
In this article I examine public statements about the relationship between private faith 
and public reason through the pronouncements of four leading politicians: Tony Blair 
(United Kingdom), Helen Clark (New Zealand), Barack Obama (United States of 
America) and Kevin Rudd (Australia). Of the four, Blair and Rudd have been most 
articulate about the way in which their own personal faith-commitments have informed 
their political motivations, but in doing so both men have had to negotiate a broader 
cultural suspicion of ‘doing God’ in public. Whilst religion may be regarded as repre-
senting a strong ‘moral compass’ for a politician, those espousing a religious faith 
in public also have to contend with public anxieties about religious extremism. Of 
the other two, I argue that Obama speaks into a more receptive public arena, and that 
part of his skill has been to tap into a long-standing tradition in American public life 
which, despite separation of church and state, is more attuned to the casting of politi-
cal values in religious language. Helen Clark is the only one of the four to identify 
herself as ‘agnostic’, yet her support for the 2007 Statement on Religious Diversity 
signals a new willingness on the part of a political culture that has tended to be ‘func-
tionally secular’ to embrace the notion of religious faith as a part of healthy civil 
society. All four examples, therefore, furnish us with insights into diﬀ erent dimensions 
of the relationship between a politician’s personal faith and their public accountability 
in contemporary western democracies. 
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Introduction 
Queen Elizabeth I famously stated that she had ‘no desire to make windows 
into men’s souls’, a statement of religious tolerance amidst the religious and 
 E. Graham / International Journal of Public Th eology 3 (2009) 144–163 145
political turbulence of the sixteenth century. Th e scars of persecution and reli-
gious wars in Europe were to be a strong inﬂ uence on Enlightenment think-
ing, especially the establishment of religious freedom and the idea of the secular 
state, and it is a principle that most western democracies value highly. Yet one 
characteristic of western society over the past decade has been the re-emergence 
of religion in matters of global and national public aﬀ airs, whether that is in 
terms of the personal values of a new generation of politicians, the pronounce-
ments on current aﬀ airs by established faith leaders, or the political mobilization 
by particular religious bodies in order to inﬂ uence public opinion. 
In this article, I want to examine the complex and often troubled relation-
ship between religion and contemporary politics, by examining the public 
statements of four leading western political ﬁ gures: Tony Blair, former British 
Prime Minister; Helen Clark, former Prime Minister of New Zealand; Kevin 
Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia; Barack Obama, President of the United 
States. However, it is not my intention to peer into their souls in order to pass 
judgement on their personal beliefs but rather, as a case study in the way con-
temporary politicians and political discourse are having to recalibrate the deli-
cate balance between faith and reason in public life. In their positioning of 
themselves as people of faith or doubt, I want to explore how the deployment 
of the discourse of ‘faith’ by these four politicians is shaping our understand-
ing of the nature of politics, identity and shared values in a post-ideological, 
post-secular, globalized world.
Th is is not so much a scrutiny of the orthodoxy or authenticity of their 
personal beliefs, therefore, as an examination of how faith serves as a form 
of ‘discourse’ in constructing an individual’s moral universe and inﬂ uencing 
other people’s sense of values. Michel Foucault uses the term ‘discourse’ to 
explore how social institutions and practices are regulated by language, and 
the way in which certain kinds of statements function as authoritative by vir-
tue of their eﬀ ectiveness in creating a world of meaning. Th e critical task is to 
examine the conditions under which certain forms of discourse govern thought 
and action. Discourses create webs of meaning that order the world in par-
ticular ways: by indicating where authority is held to lie; what constitutes 
truth and falsehood; what is virtuous and what is reprehensible. Th ey are sets 
of generative principles by which reality is ordered, or a particular world-view 
constructed and rendered axiomatic.1
1) Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: Th e Birth of the Prison (London: Allen Lane, 1977).
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Th ese politicians’ statements on faith are to be seen not merely as individual 
apologia for personal beliefs, or even a defence of the right of religion to engage 
with politics, but as strategies by which religion represents (stands in for) an 
appeal to a broader, but less coherent set of values. It requires us to interpret 
the meanings behind the sentiments and judge the eﬀ ects of introducing reli-
gious language into public life, not just as a matter of the personal motivations 
or integrity of their speakers, but as part of a broader, global realignment 
between the sacred and the secular, faith and reason; between the practices of 
religion and the exercise of citizenship. 
Religion, Secularism and Modernity
Any politician, or religious ﬁ gure, wishing to engage with questions of religion 
and public life does so against the context of a dominant tradition in western 
political thought that wishes to separate faith and public reason. According to 
this view, attempts to oﬀ er religious reasoning to public debate are illegitimate 
since they breach basic principles of liberal democracy, which hold that reli-
gion and politics cannot mix. It is a staple principle of political liberalism that 
public debate should be underpinned by secular rather than religious princi-
ples. In some political settlements, such as the United States for example, this 
has meant the constitutional separation of church and state. Th e classic per-
spective on this is often associated with the political philosopher John Rawls, 
who spelt out the basic principles of liberal democracy in a pluralist society. 
Th e liberal principle of legitimacy for the public forum has as its starting point 
the plurality of value systems in a modern society. Political, moral and reli-
gious diversity is good, since it is the outworking of that essential freedom 
of self-determination independent of external constraint. Yet, how does one 
ensure that these diﬀ erences do not spill over into sectarian conﬂ ict, and that 
political processes are not disrupted by irreconcilable diﬀ erences?
Political liberals such as Rawls argue that the limits of public reason should 
be honoured by all reasonable (reason being a great arbiter) citizens in their 
public discourse concerning fundamental political questions. As people com-
mitted to public consensus, yet knowing that they aﬃ  rm a diversity of moral, 
religious and philosophical doctrines, they should be ready to explain the basis 
of their actions to one another in terms each could reasonably expect that 
others might endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality. Rawls thus 
argues for adopting a set of values and principles that anyone would willingly 
and openly recognize as legitimate for deciding matters of constitutional 
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essentials and basic justice. It requires people to leave any set of principles that 
might inhibit that general agreement out of the realm of public debate; such 
as religious diﬀ erence, for example. Th e latter, however reasonable and valu-
able, is to be excluded from public discourse because, according to the propo-
nents of political liberalism, civility and mutual respect in public forum is 
possible only if it is grounded in consensus.2
Further elaboration of this is provided by the political philosopher Robert 
Audi when he argues that a healthy democracy depends on citizens being 
committed ‘in some way to the welfare of others’.3 In a culturally or religiously 
diverse society this will require any policy to be founded on principles avail-
able to all citizens, regardless of their personal convictions: ‘the ethics appro-
priate to a liberal democracy constrains religious considerations . . . because of 
its commitment to preserving the liberty of all’.4 Yet Audi goes on to single out 
people with religious convictions as exceptionally enthusiastic in their claims, 
and thus more likely to cause disruption. It is therefore necessary to restrain 
them from encroaching on others’ freedom of thought:
[V]ery commonly those who identify with what they regard as the ultimate divine 
source of religious reasons believe that anyone who does not identify with it is 
forsaken, damned, or in some other way fundamentally deﬁ cient . . . [R]eligious 
people often tend to be, in a way that is rare in secular matters, highly and stub-
bornly passionate about the importance of everyone’s acting in accordance with 
religious reasons.5 
Whereas secular reasoning is available to all citizens by virtue of its being 
rooted in universal human reason, any theologically-derived reasoning is par-
tisan and divisive, since it silences those who do not hold to that faith or who 
are not conversant with its vocabulary. Essentially, therefore, the fault-line 
between public and private in a liberal polity also means the establishment of 
some kind of ‘ﬁ rewall’ between the secular and the religious.
2) John Rawls, A Th eory of Justice (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
3) Robert Audi, ‘Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics’, in Robert Audi and 
Nicholas Wolterstorﬀ , Religion in the Public Square: Debating Church and State (Lanham: Row-
man and Littleﬁ eld, 1997), pp. 1–66 at p. 16. See also Esther McIntosh, ‘Philosophers, Politi-
cians and Archbishops: Religious Reasons in the Public Sphere’, International Journal of Public 
Th eology, 2:4 (2008), 465–83, especially 476–80.
4) Robert Audi, ‘Religion, Politics, and Democracy: Closing Comments and Remaining Issues’, 
in Audi and Wolterstorﬀ , Religion in the Public Square, pp. 167–74 at p. 174.
5) Audi, ‘Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics’, pp. 31–2 (original italics).
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Increasingly, though, such a separation between faith and politics is coming 
into question. An alternative view argues that only if citizens draw upon their 
own genuine convictions, seeking to achieve an ‘overlapping consensus’6 on 
basic principles, will a vibrant civil society and a healthy democratic process be 
fostered. In response to Audi’s perspective, therefore, Nicholas Wolterstorﬀ  
questions whether the freedom of the citizen in a liberal democracy necessarily 
has to involve the eﬀ acement of religious reasons in public debate.7 He argues 
against their ‘bracketing out’ since he believes that to require religious con-
straint of others amounts to a restriction upon their freedoms and civil liber-
ties as equal citizens. Wolterstorﬀ  continues, ‘I see no reason to suppose that 
the ethic of the citizen in a liberal democracy includes a restraint on the use of 
religious reasons in deciding and discussing political issues’.8 
Greater clarity on this dilemma might be brought if we were to distinguish 
between two diﬀ erent types of the separation of religion and public life. Sun-
der Katwala argues that there has been a confusion or conﬂ ation of two dis-
tinct principles of the liberal state: ﬁ rst, that the state should not privilege one 
form of religious expression or favour particular teachings in its social policies; 
secondly, that religion should be kept entirely private. Yet the ﬁ rst does not 
necessarily entail the other; in fact, like Wolterstorﬀ , Katwala questions the 
basic precept that ‘religious citizens must abstract themselves from their deep-
est beliefs in accepting an iron distinction between private beliefs and public 
values’.9 Katwala distinguishes ‘ideological’ secularism (the ‘ﬁ rewall’ between 
religion and the state) with ‘pragmatic’ secularism, which respects the preroga-
tive of religious participants to advance religious views in articulating public 
values. Th e principles of human rights should prohibit discrimination against 
any citizen on the grounds of religion (such as their exclusion from public 
debate), just as they would enshrine respect for a diversity of gender, sexuality 
and ethnicity.10
Rowan Williams has recently made a similar distinction between what he 
terms ‘programmatic’ and ‘procedural’ secularism. Whilst programmatic secu-
larism suspends any talk of value in a semblance of instrumental neutrality, 
 6) John Rawls, ‘Th e Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7:1 
(1987), 1–25.
 7) Nicholas Wolterstorﬀ , ‘Th e Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues’, 
in Audi and Wolterstorﬀ , Religion in the Public Square, pp. 67–120 at pp. 111–112.
 8) Ibid.
 9) Sunder Katwala, ‘Faith in Democracy: Th e Legitimate Role of Religion’, Public Policy Research 
(December-February 2006), 246–51 at 248.
10) Ibid.
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procedural secularism engages with but attempts to adjudicate between, com-
peting convictions:
Th e empty public square of programmatic secularism implies in eﬀ ect that the 
almost value-free atmosphere of public neutrality and the public invisibility of 
speciﬁ c commitments is enough to provide sustainable moral energy for a properly 
self-critical society. But it is not at all self-evident that people can so readily detach 
their perspectives and policies in social or political discussion from fundamental 
convictions that are not allowed to be mentioned or manifested in public.11
Yet complex negotiation is still required when faith groups or individuals 
expect to enter the political arena to state public claims on the basis of private 
commitments.12 Th is might depend on a view of the public sphere that is not 
so much neutral, as in classic liberal theory, as mediated; varying philosophies 
and truth-claims may be seen as having their own integrity whilst also requir-
ing a degree of ‘translation’ into a shared space of public discourse. What I 
want to do next, therefore, is to see how our selected ﬁ gures are intervening 
into the changing dynamics of religion, taking account of factors both local 
and global in their various contexts, in order to participate, even inﬂ uence, 
this whole scale realignment of religion and religious values in public life. I 
begin with one politician whose political stance was deeply informed by faith 
and yet he struggled to maintain this against increasing public scepticism. 
Private Faith and Public Reason 
Tony Blair
A practising Christian since his days at Oxford University, Blair was initially 
quite articulate and open in discussing how his faith informed his politics. Yet 
Blair actually became more diﬃ  dent over his decade in power, increasingly 
aware that he trod a ﬁ ne line between the UK electorate’s admiration of him 
11) Rowan Williams, ‘Secularism, Faith and Freedom’, Pontiﬁ cal Academy of Social Sciences 
(23 November 2006), <http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/654> [accessed 8 August 2008]. 
See also Mike Higton, ‘Rowan Williams and Sharia: Defending the Secular’, International Jour-
nal of Public Th eology, 2:4 (2008), 400–417.
12) See Richard Neuhaus, Th e Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (Grand 
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1984), p. 36.
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as a creature of principle and a religious fanatic.13 As the historian Callum 
Brown put it, Blair always risked transgressing the classically British sentiment 
about religion, ‘best not to take it too far’.14 His advisor Alistair Campbell is 
famously reported to have intervened in an interview to prevent Blair answer-
ing a question about his religious beliefs, allegedly with the comment, ‘We 
don’t do God’.15 
Blair’s pronouncements on the relationship between ‘faith’ and ‘politics’ went 
through a number of signiﬁ cant phases during his political career. 16 From the 
early 1990s through to the General Election of 1997, it was about the renewal 
of  New Labour’s political fortunes that found in the legacy of Christian socialism 
a valuable moral depth and direction. As one of a cohort of new shadow min-
isters publicly associated with the Christian Socialist Movement from the early 
1990s (which also included current Prime Minister, Gordon Brown), Tony 
Blair contributed to a number of manifestos and publications which explored 
the signiﬁ cance of Christian values for democratic socialism. Religion, and in 
particular the Christian social tradition, became ﬁ rmly established as a central 
point in (New) Labour’s ‘moral compass’,17 and Blair found in Christianity’s 
combination of personal responsibility with community values a powerful 
summary of the emergent ‘third way’ between free market individualism and 
state centralism.18
13) In a televised interview after leaving oﬃ  ce Blair oﬀ ers the opinion that: ‘you talk about 
[religion] in our system, and frankly, people think you’re a nutter’. BBC 1, ‘Th e Blair Years’, 
(25 November 2007).
14) Callum Brown, ‘‘Best Not to Take it Too Far’: How the British Cut Religion Down to Size’, 
Opendemocracy.net (8 March 2006), 18 paras at para. 2, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/
globalization-institutions_government/britain_religion_3335.jsp > [accessed 11 May 2007].
15) Colin Brown, ‘Campbell Interrupted Blair as He Spoke of His Faith: ‘We Don’t Do God’’, 
Telegraph (3 May 2003), <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news/uknews/1429109/Campbell-
interrupted-Blair-as-he-spoke-of-his-faith-We-dont-do-God.html> [accessed 11 May 2007]. See 
also McIntosh, ‘Philosophers, Politicians and Archbishops’, 479.
16) For a fuller discussion of Blair’s faith in relation to politics, see Elaine L. Graham, ‘Doing 
God? Public Th eology under Blair’, in P. M. Scott, C. R. Baker and E. L. Graham, eds, Remor-
alising Britain? Ten Years of New Labour: Faith, Morals and Governance (London: Continuum, 
2009), pp. 1–18.
17) For Gordon Brown’s reference to religion, see Patrick Wintour, ‘I Will Not Let Britain Down’, 
Guardian (25 September 2007), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,2176532,00.
html> [accessed 30 September 2007]; for a critique of the term ‘moral compass’, see Francis 
Davis, Elizabeth Paulhus and Andrew Bradstock, Moral, But No Compass: Government, Church 
and the Future of Welfare (London: Matthew James Publishing, 2008), p. 13.
18) See Tony Blair, ‘Foreword’, in Christopher Bryant, ed., Reclaiming the Ground: Christianity 
and Socialism (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1993), pp. 10–12.
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Nor was Blair afraid to admit to holding religious values. Yet in the dying 
days of the John Major administration (and by then Leader of the Opposi-
tion) Blair wanted such values to be understood by the electorate not as some-
thing that set him apart from the tough decisions of governance, but as a very 
demonstration of his realism and moral robustness. Blair’s comments on reli-
gion in relation to politics at this time may therefore be construed as a strate-
gic intervention into prevailing political discourse at a time of considerable 
volatility in terms of the relationship between values and public debate.
Once New Labour came to power in 1997, Blair’s reputation as a man of 
principle was used to underpin a programme of ‘remoralization’: an explicit 
resort to the language of ‘values’ in public policy (especially in foreign aﬀ airs), 
but with a concomitant burden on citizens as moral agents, thereby shifting 
democratic discourse from one of ‘rights’ to that of ‘responsibility’.19 After the 
attacks of 11 September 2001 and the allies’ invasion of Iraq in March 2003 
however, Blair found the ground shifting beneath his feet, as professions of 
personal conviction, formerly the solid bedrock of his public probity, fell on 
the stonier ground of public suspicion of ‘doing God’ in the face of the resur-
gence of religious fundamentalism and widespread opposition to military 
intervention in Iraq.
For example, in the spring of 2003, when the allies were preparing to invade 
Iraq, some sections of the British media claimed that those close to Tony Blair 
had advised him not to end a televised address by saying, ‘God bless you’ on 
the basis that viewers would be alienated by its explicitly religious nature. 
Instead, he closed with the words, ‘thank you’.20 In an interview broadcast at 
Christmas 2008, Blair reﬂ ected on the ambivalence with which his faith stance 
was received by the public as follows: ‘It’s too diﬃ  cult, whist you’re actually in 
oﬃ  ce, to talk about these things in a way that doesn’t get misinterpreted, or 
people end up thinking, you know, when it comes to critical decisions that 
you’re taking, somehow you’ve got a hotline to God . . . rather than looking at 
things in a practical temporal way’.21
If this is a sign of a greater hesitancy in the face of a realization of the 
divisive potential of religion as political discourse, then it may reﬂ ect the fact 
that the language of faith and the invocation of religious values on the part of 
religious leaders and politicians had now come to be seen as an evasion of 
19) See P. M. Scott, C. R. Baker and E. L. Graham, ‘When Remoralising Fails?’, in Scott, Baker 
and Graham, eds, Remoralising Britain? Ten years of New Labour, pp. 226–48.
20) Brown, ‘Campbell Interrupted Blair as He Spoke of His Faith’.
21) BBC 1, ‘Christmas Voices’ (14 December 2008).
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democratic accountability rather than a means of enriching our vocabulary of 
civic virtue. As he left oﬃ  ce, therefore, and the Blair decade came to an end, 
we could perhaps see a shift in his own discursive synthesis of religion, remor-
alization and politics. Increasingly, he distinguished between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
religion, of whatever tradition; a conviction that led him to the establishment 
of his Faith Foundation in 2008. From establishing New Labour’s electoral 
credibility, and by extension, his own integrity at a time of unprecedented 
volatility in terms of political aﬃ  liations, Blair’s religious commitments have 
now propelled him away from party policy, indeed away from domestic poli-
tics altogether, towards a fascination with religion as a universal quest for moral 
values that deﬁ ne our very humanity.
Blair’s discourse of religious conviction makes more sense, however, if we 
regard it as something intended to be pitched into a cultural and political 
context of what Anthony Giddens terms ‘reﬂ exivity’, as a key characteristic of 
late modernity, which he uses to describe the nature of personal identity.22 He 
summarizes reﬂ exivity as the situation in which ‘social practices are constantly 
examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about these very 
practices, thus constitutively altering their character’.23 Th is element of uncer-
tainty and the collapse of foundational thinking—‘reason has lost its founda-
tion, history its direction, and progress its allure’24—Giddens terms ‘radicalized 
modernity’.
Ambitions shift from the grand narrative of emancipation towards the ‘life 
politics’ of self-actualization as political solidarities, theories of the state, the 
primacy of the market are all scrutinized and dissipated. Politics becomes a kind 
of pragmatism in which no single agent, no one cause, can direct the course of 
history, although there are still ‘many points of political engagement which oﬀ er 
good cause for optimism’.25 Th e third way, states Giddens, is about helping citi-
zens to ‘pilot their way through the major revolutions of our time: globalization, 
transformations in personal life and our relationship to nature’.26
Within this perspective, Blair’s discursive interventions are in part about a 
search for a reliable and coherent public language by which he can establish 
22) Anthony Giddens, Th e Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 38.
23) Ibid.
24) Christopher G. A. Bryant and David Jary, ‘Anthony Giddens’, in G. Ritzer, ed., Th e Blackwell 
Companion to Major Social Th eorists (Oxford: Blackwell,1990), p. 683.
25) Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: Th e Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1994), p. 21. 
26) Anthony Giddens, Th e Th ird Way: Th e Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1998), p. 64 (my italics).
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his, and New Labour’s, political credentials. Th e recurrent references to values 
may have originated in Blair’s theological convictions, but they were intended 
to appeal not to a common culture of [Christian] belief but to resonate with 
an electorate in search of a ‘moral compass’ of their own. In that context, 
speaking from the heart and providing a moral and religious rationale for his 
policies rooted in personal conviction becomes an alternative to appeals to 
political theories or class solidarities with which people no longer identify. 
Kevin Rudd 
Kevin Rudd, elected Prime Minister of Australia in November 2007, went 
against the grain of predominantly secularist public debate in that country 
when still leader of the opposition in 2006, by writing about the connections 
between faith and politics.27 Th is was more than a personal confession of faith, 
however, being quite overtly party-political in criticizing what Rudd calls ‘the 
political orchestration of various forms of organised Christianity in support of 
the conservative incumbency’28 on the part of George W. Bush in the US and 
John Howard in his own country.
Rather than bolstering the interests of the powerful within a conservative 
programme that stresses family values and personal morality at the expense of 
social justice, Rudd argues that the instincts of Christianity are prophetic and 
counter-cultural. He invokes the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeﬀ er as a 
potential role-model for those seeking an alternative model of political engage-
ment, calling him ‘a man of faith . . . a man of reason . . . a man of letters . . . 
above all . . . a man of action.’29 It is noteworthy that ‘faith’, which might alien-
ate some, is quickly complemented by words that broaden the appeal.
Rudd traces how historically, Christianity moved from being an oppressed 
minority into the state religion. Now, it is no longer predominant, and it is 
rediscovering a counter-cultural, yet engaged position. Rudd knows, there-
fore, that he is no longer addressing a common religious culture. Th e essence 
of Christianity’s political witness is on behalf of the marginalized, the oppressed, 
the poor, although there must be a balance of realism between social justice 
and wealth creation: a plea for a form of realism that respects proportionality 
and pluralism whilst acting out of conviction. Essentially the vocation of the 
27) See Marion Maddox, ‘Religion, Secularism and the Promise of Public Th eology’, Interna-
tional Journal of Public Th eology, 1:1 (2007), 82–100.
28) Kevin Rudd, ‘Faith in Politics’, Th e Monthly, 17 (October 2006), p. 5 at p. 1, <http://www.
themonthly.com.au/excerpts/issue17_excerpt_001.html> [accessed 12 June 2007].
29) Ibid., p. 1.
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church is to ‘speak truth to power’; Rudd argues, ‘Bonhoeﬀ er’s political theol-
ogy is therefore one of a dissenting church that speaks truth to the state, and 
does so by giving voice to the voiceless’.30
Interviewed subsequently on ABC Radio, Rudd elaborated further on the 
context of the article and some of his reasoning behind its publication. He 
admitted that in the past he had kept his Christian faith to himself, stating: 
‘It’s very much the Australian way, and if I had my way, that would be my 
way as well’, but he was motivated to speak out in the face of campaigns by 
the right-wing Family First party to recruit conservative evangelical religious 
groups to their cause.31 Rudd parodies the right-wing appeal to religious values 
in this way: 
Vote for me because I’m a Christian, vote for me because I have a deﬁ ned set of 
views on questions of private sexual morality, and vote for me also because I chant 
the political mantra of ‘family values’ . . . ‘Religion should be kept out of poli-
tics’ . . . Th is is a view which says that should anyone seek to articulate from a 
Christian perspective a view on the Iraq war, on poverty in the world, on asylum 
seekers, on indigenous Australians, or on workplace relations, then judgement 
may be rained down upon them from the heavens above.32 
Overall, Rudd’s opposition to such an appeal reﬂ ects his desire to reclaim 
much of the ground that had been ceded to conservative, confessional inter-
ests in favour of a more progressive public theology that chooses to deﬁ ne 
‘morality’ and ‘faith’ in more inclusive, socially responsible ways.
In the interview, Rudd insists that he was addressing people of faith as a 
person of faith, and he was concerned to challenge the view that God can be 
the exclusive property of the Christian Right. He states: ‘I haven’t been calling 
for necessarily . . . a greater Christian voice in politics . . . I’ve simply called for a 
diﬀ erent Christian voice in politics’.33
Yet he was aware that he was speaking into a pluralist context and that his 
speciﬁ c theological stance would not necessarily render it illegitimate: 
30) Ibid, p. 2.
31) See Maddox, ‘Religion, Secularism and the Promise of Public Th eology’.
32) Rudd, ‘Faith in Politics’, p. 4.
33) Th e Religion Report, ‘Summer Season: Kevin Rudd: Bonhoeﬀ er and ‘the Political Orchestra-
tion of Organised Christianity’’, ABC Radio National (3 January2007), paras 36 at para. 12 
(my italics), <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/religionreport/stories/2007/1810679.htm> [accessed 
14 June 2008], p. 2.
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A Christian perspective on contemporary policy debates may not prevail. It must 
nonetheless be argued. And once heard, it must be weighed, together with other 
arguments from diﬀ erent philosophical traditions, in a fully contestable secular 
polity. A Christian perspective, informed by a social gospel or Christian socialist 
tradition, should not be rejected contemptuously by secular politicians as if these 
views are an unwelcome intrusion into the political sphere. If the churches are 
barred from participating in the great debates about the values that ultimately 
underpin our society, our economy and our polity, then we have reached a very 
strange place indeed.34
Rudd shares Bonhoeﬀ er’s vision of ‘a just world delivered by social action, 
driven by personal faith’.35 While these may be shaped by Christian convic-
tion, they are common values with deep roots in Australian society that tran-
scend any particular group; in fact, its power lies in its insistence on transcending 
self-interest to embrace an inclusive and global community. Rudd states: ‘Th is 
is an Australia which takes the values of decency, fairness and compassion that 
are still etched deep in our national soul, despite a decade of oxygen depriva-
tion, and breathes them afresh into the great debates now faced by our coun-
try and the international community’.36 
Rudd’s statements may have been intended to capture the trust of sceptical 
voters, or establish his credibility with the electorate, but it was also about 
breaking the monopoly of a particular kind of religious intervention in public 
life and putting forward an alternative, as well as sketching out the territory on 
which Rudd would lead Labor (successfully, as it transpired) into the next 
election. Rudd was seeking to deﬁ ne the role of faith in politics as more than 
a functional one of delivering welfare services, or linking government with 
hard to reach communities or guaranteeing social cohesion. He wanted there 
to be space for a language of values in relation to faith and, perhaps like Blair, 
to the rejuvenation of political debate. Yet it was not about making Labor a 
‘Christian’ or ‘Christian socialist’ party, since Rudd respects the secular and 
pluralist nature of the state. Nevertheless, he was arguing for people to be able 
to bring religion into their political activism and moral reasoning in the name 
of a healthy democracy. Rudd’s statements ﬁ t well into the traditions of main-
stream public theology, as a model of faith tempered or harnessed by reason, 
and of the adoption of a form of ‘bilingualism’ which is both rooted in the 
34) Rudd, ‘Faith in Politics’, p. 4. 
35) Ibid., p. 5.
36) Ibid.
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speciﬁ cs of Christian tradition but seeks to translate that into more publicly 
accessible language.37
Barack Obama 
While public discourse and political campaigning in the US, especially for 
Presidency, is altogether more comfortable with public professions of faith 
than Australia or the UK, the Democrats have struggled in the past to capture 
the religious vote and have fought shy of campaigning on ‘Christian moral 
values’. Yet Barack Obama is a politician whose political roots are in church-
related broad-based organizing in Chicago, and who has clearly been shaped 
by the rhetoric and ideals of the 1960s civil rights movement, which in turn 
owes a tremendous debt to religion in general and the African-American 
church in particular. To hear Obama speak is to be vividly reminded of the 
language and cadences of the African-American pulpit, transposed into public 
oratory, and acutely reminiscent of the religious-political speeches of Martin 
Luther King Jr a generation ago. 
Obama is a church member (although a Newsweek poll reported in spring 
2008 that thirteen percent of those polled thought he was a Muslim),38 but he 
resigned his membership of Trinity United Church of Christ in Chicago fol-
lowing controversial comments from its pastor, Jeremiah Wright. Wright had 
claimed in his sermons that 9/11 was a punishment for the United States’ 
imperialist foreign policy and that HIV/AIDS was deliberately introduced 
into the African-American population by the government. ‘No, no, no, not 
‘God Bless America’’ he declaimed, ‘‘God damn America, that’s in the Bible, 
for killing innocent people!’’39 It was probably expedient for Obama to dis-
tance himself from Wright and his congregation for the sake of his public 
image; whilst it is de rigueur for all Presidential candidates to make an open 
profession of Christianity, any aﬃ  liation with anything too contentious, or 
too closely identiﬁ ed with a particular ethnic group, such as Wright’s diatribe, 
could prove fatally damaging.
Several commentators have focused not on Obama’s private convictions, 
however, but on his ability to draw upon the tradition of American political 
37) See Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, ‘Nurturing Reason: Th e Public Role of Religion in the Liberal 
State’, Ned Geref Teologiese Tydskrif, 48:1–2 (March-June 2007), 25–41 at 35; also Duncan For-
rester, ‘Th e Scope of Public Th eology’, Studies in Christian Ethics, 17:2 (2004), 5–19.
38) Eve Conant and Richard Wolﬀ e, ‘Obama’s New Gospel’, Newsweek (12 May 2008), <http://
www.newsweek.com/id/135384> [accessed 13 January 2009].
39) Timothy Lavin, ‘Chimes of Freedom’, Th e Tablet (3 May 2008), 4–5 at 4.
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discourse that allows, even expects, overt (if non-speciﬁ c) reference to faith 
and God.40 In speaking about hope, vision, and aspiration as fundamental to 
his political project, Obama is mining a deep and rich vein of the religious 
foundations of America’s national identity, of its destiny as divine gift and of 
its democratic, egalitarian polity as embodying the best of the human spirit. It 
chimes in perfectly with Robert Bellah’s analysis of ‘civil religion’.41 In the 
absence of any prescribed or oﬃ  cial religion, the nation develops a set of 
shared symbols that transcend sectional interest and become the overarching 
ideals against which national identity and common purpose are deﬁ ned. It is 
reminiscent, too, of Martin Marty’s identiﬁ cation of the pronouncements 
of the founders of the American republic as constituting a fundamental strand 
of modern public theology.42 Obama may be seen in the tradition of Franklin 
Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln as advancing a form of political discourse 
that rests implicitly on religious values, despite the formal separation of church 
and state. 
For Obama, therefore, it is not simply about portraying himself as a trust-
worthy individual, as in Blair’s case, but about rooting his ambitions in a set 
of collective ideals that can only be expressed in religious language. Yet in his 
campaign, Obama successfully drew on another tradition: that of religion as a 
potent source of social capital, or the values and norms that inspire us to forge 
social bonds, to form relationships of trust and outreach. According to schol-
ars such as Robert Putnam, those who belong to communities of faith are 
statistically more likely to be active in charitable or political causes, and it is 
religious organizations that are often at the heart of neighbourhood net-
works.43 Obama articulates this precisely, in saying that religion oﬀ ers a frame-
work of meaning and values that connect us, just as sociological theory refers 
to religion as a source of ‘social cohesion’ that protects individuals from ano-
mie and connects them to collective mores. In Jonathan Raban’s words: 
Americans want a narrative arc to their lives. Th ey are looking to relieve a chronic 
loneliness . . . Th ey are not just destined to travel down that long highway towards 
40) Jonathan Raban, ‘Good News in Bad Times’, Guardian (5 January 2008).
41) Robert Bellah, ‘Civil Religion in America’, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, 96:1 (1967), 1–21.
42) Martin E. Marty, ‘Reinhold Niebuhr: Public Th eology and the American Experience’, Journal 
of Religion, 54:4 (1974), 332–59.
43) Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: Th e Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2000).
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nothingness . . . Without a vessel for my beliefs, without a commitment to a par-
ticular community of faith, at some level I would always remain apart, and alone.44
Again, we may view this through an understanding about the reﬂ exivity of late 
modernity, in which the electorate is looking for bearings by which to set 
its ‘moral compass’, not necessarily by following the content of a politician’s 
beliefs so much as identifying with an almost autobiographical quest to estab-
lish their own orientation. For Obama, religion provides that ‘narrative arc’, 
sets out a world-view into which he can immerse himself and, in the process, 
tap into its language, symbols and traditions. Further, African-American the-
ology and church life generates the ‘faithful capital’ that drives social renewal. 
Th e churches are guardians of values that characterize America’s faith in itself 
and its people, united in a recovery of its founding principles. According 
to Raban:
What the crowds crave from this scrupulous agnostic is his capacity to deliver the 
ecstatic consolation of old-time religion—a vision of America that transcends dif-
ferences of race, class and party, and restores harmony to a land riven under the 
oppressive rule of a government alien to its founding principles.45
Another example comes from earlier in the campaign for the Democratic 
nomination, from an interview Obama gave with David Brooks of the New 
York Times in April 2007. Brooks asks Obama what he has been reading 
recently, to which Obama replies by quoting the (ostensibly) unlikely choice 
of the liberal Protestant public theologian and ethicist Reinhold Niebuhr. 
When asked what he takes away from his reading of Niebuhr, Obama’s answer 
is carefully measured, but directed against political opponents both within 
and beyond his own party, with particular censure aimed at those who allow 
an excessively doctrinaire world-view to inform their political decisions. 
He states: 
I take away . . . the compelling idea that there’s serious evil in the world, and hard-
ship and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our belief that we can 
eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t use that as an excuse for cynicism and 
44) Raban, ‘Good News in Bad Times’.
45) Ibid.
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inaction. I take away the sense that we have to make these eﬀ orts knowing they 
are hard, and not swinging from naïve idealism to bitter realism.46 
It is signiﬁ cant that Obama chooses to invoke the work of a formidable public 
intellectual and a key ﬁ gure in the twentieth-century tradition of theologically 
informed comment on social, economic and political aﬀ airs.47 His interest in 
the moral legacy of Niebuhr’s Christian realism for contemporary interna-
tional aﬀ airs, is another example, I contend, of a deliberate eﬀ ort to commu-
nicate across gulfs of religious and moral pluralism into a shared public 
discourse, in ways that manage to respect the pluralism of the intended audi-
ence without selling short the speaker’s integrity. 
Helen Clark 
Helen Clark, Prime Minister of New Zealand between 1999 and 2008, diﬀ ers 
from the other three ﬁ gures in that she identiﬁ es herself as an agnostic. Yet in 
spite of that, she has been prominent, even outspoken, on the importance of 
respecting religious faith and diversity within Aotearoa New Zealand, as evi-
denced by her support for the New Zealand Statement of Religious Diversity, 
published in May 2007. Th is Statement, if realized eﬀ ectively in workable 
public policy, represents a very considerable departure from the relationship 
between religion and the state contained within the classic liberal western 
Enlightenment model. It does not envisage the neutral, secular state insisting 
on the ‘bracketing out’ of religious conviction and aﬃ  liation in matters to do 
with citizenship, national identity and multiculturalism; instead it reﬂ ects an 
understanding that cultural diversity has to embrace religious diversity, and that 
this may have to be promoted and protected by the state in various ways. 
In launching the Statement at a Regional Inter-Faith Conference in Wait-
angi in May 2007 Clark said: 
My government works hard to ensure that all ethnicities and faiths are valued and 
included in 21st century New Zealand. I hope that the spirit of Waitangi will 
assist your work . . . on how the many faiths and cultures in our region can live in 
46) David Brooks, ‘Obama, Gospel and Verse’, Th e New York Times (26 April 2007), <http://select.
nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=FA0810FD3E5A0C758EDDA> [accessed 12 June 2007]. 
47) Marty refers to Niebuhr as the exemplar of this mainstream tradition of public theology. 
Marty, ‘Reinhold Niebuhr: Public Th eology and the American Experience’.
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harmony . . . For we do not accept that there is anything inevitable or unavoidable 
about tension and conﬂ ict between ethnicities, cultures, and faiths.48 
Ostensibly, an innocuous endorsement of the Statement, yet Clark’s close 
association with it came under strong attack from secularist and humanist 
groups, as well as from conservative Christians, with much of the antipathy 
directed towards Clark herself.49 Nevertheless, this is entirely consistent with 
my overall thesis, I think; that in a culture of political and personal reﬂ exivity 
people are looking to the personal comportment of politicians in these mat-
ters, and so Clark’s integrity is inevitably implicated.
Th e 2007 Statement on Religious Diversity and Clark’s advocacy of it, 
within the broader scope of the government’s ambitions towards social cohe-
sion, represent a signiﬁ cant acknowledgement of a religious dimension to 
public life in Aotearoa New Zealand. As one commentator, Joris de Bres, 
remarks, such a Statement does not contradict the non-partisan brief of the 
New Zealand Human Rights Commission, since ‘the State has as much of a 
responsibility to engage with citizens who share a community of belief as they 
do with those who share a community of culture, ethnicity or geography’.50 
Clark seems to have little embarrassment about ‘doing God’ in public; and 
perhaps the absence of a personal agenda—in all but the minds of her most 
virulent opponents—helps to ease her policy of a characteristically Kiwi ‘non-
alignment’ in matters spiritual.51
48) Helen Clark, Address at Opening Ceremony of the Th ird Asia-Paciﬁ c Regional Interfaith 
Dialogue (29 May 2007), <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/print.html?path=PA0705/S00741.
htm> [accessed 14 June 2008]. Th e phrase ‘the spirit of Waitangi’ is a reference to the 1840 
Treaty of Waitangi, which is regarded by many as having established a form of biculturalism 
between Maori and Pakeha (European) settlers.
49) See for example, ‘Helen Clark’s Diplomacy’, Open Parachute (30 May 2007), <http://openparachute.
wordpress.com/2007/05/30/%C2%B6-helen-clarks-diplomacy/> [accessed 21 June 2008] and 
NZPA, ‘Tamaki To Protest as Leaders Discuss Religious Diversity’, infonews.co.nz (29 May 2007), 
http://www.infonews.co.nz/news.cfm?1=1+t=124&id=2107 [accessed 5 August 2008].
50) Joris de Bres, ‘Human Rights and Religious Diversity’, Aotearoa Ethnic Network Journal, 2:2 
(August 2007), 9–14 at 9.
51) She is commended for lending her oﬃ  cial support to many multi-faith activities, such as 
hosting Eid and Diwali celebrations at Parliament; see Chris Carter, ‘Parliament to Celebrate 
Rosh Hashanah’, beehive.govt.nz (9 September 2008), <http://feeds.beehive.govt.nz/release/
parliament+celebrate+rosh+hashanah> [accessed 13 January 2009]. See also Mike Houlahan, ‘MPs 
Want Prayer Changes to Reﬂ ect Religious Diversity (New Zealand), Religious Diversity News: 
Th e Pluralism Project (1 June 2007), <http://www.pluralism.org/news/article.php?id=16474> 
[accessed 13 January 2009].
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In support of the 2007 Statement, one could argue that by enshrining 
religious identity and aﬃ  liation in public policy, the government is taking 
a signiﬁ cant step to guarantee the parameters of social cohesion against the 
manifestations of religious resurgence globally. In the classic liberal segrega-
tion of religion and politics, as an ideal form of ‘strong’ secularism, all partisan 
values and principles, especially theologically derived ones, are to be insulated 
from the public domain. In a ‘post-secular’ world, however, such a distinction 
could actually militate against any kind of public transparency or account-
ability on the part of minority religious groups, by disallowing any common 
space in which religiously motivated policies could be debated. Neither secu-
lar states nor secularist public rhetoric are necessarily a protection against 
religiously motivated politics; quite the opposite, in fact, if a residue or minor-
ity of religious parties takes on the mission of actively shaping the political 
or civic agenda. Without a statement on religious diversity that is both theo-
logical and political, New Zealand might ﬁ nd itself vulnerable to such a 
process.52
While Clark’s commitment to religious diversity is to be welcomed, how-
ever, there is little indication of how this might translate into ﬁ rm public 
policy beyond broad statements about diﬀ erence and respect. In fact, the ini-
tiative may be driven as much by the agenda of national security as by the 
broad principles of human rights. Whereas the authors of the report stress the 
value of interfaith relations and a Statement such as this is a step towards 
‘learning the art of dialogue’53 between faith communities and wider society, 
Clark’s comments in her Preface betray a second concern. ‘It is my hope’, 
she states, ‘that the Statement will help all New Zealanders, of whatever faith 
or ethical belief, to feel free to practice their beliefs in peace and within the 
law’.54 Th e Statement does contain some comment on people’s right to prac-
tise religion free from harassment, and the need to address disputes between 
faiths, however that might be sanctioned by legislation, but Clark’s emphasis 
also reﬂ ects a tension between aspirations towards interfaith understanding 
52) Th is is an interesting echo of Katwala’s position that the segregation of faith and politics may 
actually constitute a form of discrimination against those whose cultural backgrounds do not 
recognize such a distinction; see Katwala, ‘Faith in Democracy’.
53) Dame Sylvia Cartwright, ‘Foreword’, Religious Diversity in New Zealand: Statement on Reli-
gious Diversity (New Zealand Diversity Action Programme, 2007), p. 2, <http://www.hrc.co.
nz/hrc_new/hrc/cms/ﬁ les/documents/25-May-2007_08–24–50_NSRD_booklet.pdf> [accessed 
13 January 2009]. 
54) Helen Clark, ‘Preface’, Religious Diversity in New Zealand, p. 1.
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and government anxiety about national security, social cohesion and religious 
extremism.55 
Analysis
I have been tracing various interventions across a range of contexts made by 
four political ﬁ gures regarding faith and politics. Each of them is, I argue, 
speaking into a slightly diﬀ erent discourse about how religion should or should 
not shape public life. For three out of the four that involves identifying them-
selves with a particular faith commitment, but overall I think we can see how 
such professions have to be mediated into a wider context in which religion of 
one or many kinds carries meanings and associations that have to be negoti-
ated carefully. What seems to be new at the start of the twenty-ﬁ rst century is 
the sense that religion is seen as a powerful and legitimate source of private 
motivation and public values; if not for the population at large, then at least 
in some respect by proxy. Yet at the same time, to speak of faith in public 
requires delicate handling, as the pronouncements of all these political ﬁ gures 
demonstrate. In public contexts, in which to claim an allegiance to faith is 
increasingly suspect, the language of faith has to be carefully mediated and its 
deployment highly contextual.
In the UK, Blair’s identiﬁ cation of himself as a ‘person of faith’ was undoubt-
edly a part of the ‘remoralizing’ of British politics in the 1990s, although his 
increasing reticence about his beliefs reﬂ ects a growing scepticism towards 
‘doing God’ in public among the British public. By contrast, however, Obama’s 
inauguration in January 2009 may signal a rejuvenation of American political 
discourse as he injects a renewed public theology of idealism into a tired and 
discredited oﬃ  ce. Similarly, Rudd’s desire to realign Australian politics towards 
the centre-left has involved a repudiation of religion as equated with conserva-
tive morality and the defence of ‘family values’, in favour of a tradition of 
Christian socialism as part of a contemporary progressive social democratic 
vision. Clark’s insistence on facing up to the issue of religious diversity in a 
political culture that has tended to be ‘functionally secular’ both upholds a 
strong advocacy of a particular model of religious faith as a part of healthy civil 
society and speaks into a political tradition proud of its multicultural and 
55) During the Report’s preparation, Clark stated that government did need to address the ques-
tion of religious extremism to prevent the kind of second and third generation Muslim activism 
seen in the UK. Audrey Young, ‘Clark Calls For Action to Combat Extremism’, New Zealand 
Herald (27 December 2006).
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socially cohesive heritage. Yet the shadows of the global ‘war on terror’ are also 
evident at the margins of her endorsement of religious diversity as a guarantor 
of social cohesion.
My argument is that the various statements on the part of these ﬁ gures 
represent interventions in complex, multi-layered ‘discourses’ about the nature 
of faith in public life, and they are an appeal to those who see the need, in the 
words of Margaret Archer, to ‘value values’.56 One of the reasons for this state 
of aﬀ airs might be the reﬂ exivity that I introduced earlier. While citizens are 
more and more concerned to pilot their way, according to their expressive 
desires, in the context of the decline of social and cultural prominence of reli-
gious leaders, politicians are increasingly charged with the task of providing 
the bearings for a society’s ‘moral compass’. Perhaps in this respect politics, like 
religion, has shifted ‘from a form of social engagement, focused on commit-
ment to a bounded community, to a form of consumption, focused on indi-
vidual needs which may change over time’.57 In the absence of hard and fast 
aﬃ  liations to labour unions or long-term commitment to political ideologies, 
the personal integrity of politicians comes to matter more. It becomes less 
compelling and less eﬀ ective for political ﬁ gures to speak out of traditions of 
political philosophy, but more signiﬁ cant to represent themselves as the kinds 
of people who understand what it means to ‘value values’ in political debate.
Questions of the common good, and of virtue and vision, both personal 
and corporate, lie at the heart of any healthy body politic, and it is to their 
credit that all four of the political leaders I have discussed are seeking to uphold 
that aspect of public life. My use of the terminology of ‘discourse’ serves to 
draw attention to the fact that such statements are doing more than simply 
describing a set of convictions; they are performing a political function, by 
importantly providing a set of publicly articulated values that are capable of 
connecting with the electorate in a particular way, creating alignments and 
meanings about the nature of politics that go beyond speciﬁ c questions of 
religious aﬃ  liation to the very well-springs of shared values that make up the 
body politic.
56) Margaret Archer, Making Our Way Th rough the World: Human Reﬂ exivity and Social Mobility 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 230.
57) Mathew Guest, ‘Reconceiving the Congregation as a Source of Authenticity’, in Jane Gar-
nett, Matthew Grimley and Alana Harris, eds, Redeﬁ ning Christian Britain: Post 1945 Perspectives 
(London: SCM Press, 2006), pp. 63–72 at p. 63.
